COLORADO JUSTICE 2030

Accelerating Justice Through Rule Reform, Workflow Modernization, and Verified Uses of Artificial Intelligence

A Report and Proposal Submitted to the Colorado Supreme Court

Prepared by
Ronald Lewis
Citizen Proponent
Lakewood, Colorado

Day One Policy Lab
October 2026

Contents

Executive Summary 3
Methodology and Sources 5
Part I. The Delay Record 6
Part II. The Error Record 9
Part III. The Reimagination: An Integrated Artificial Intelligence Layer for Colorado Criminal Justice 11
Part IV. The Proposal 18
- Pillar 1. End Long Litigation Periods 18
- Pillar 2. Decrease Wrongful Determinations 20
- Pillar 3. Improve Workflows 22
- Pillar 4. Build a Stronger Justice System 23

Part V. Implementation Roadmap and Cost Framing 25
Part VI. Scope and Limits of This Proposal 27
Notes 28
Appendix A. Sources and Bibliography 31
Appendix B. Index of Proposed Rule Actions 34

Executive Summary

ES.1 This report asks the Colorado Supreme Court to do for the administration of justice what the Court has already begun to do for legal technology: measure the system's performance honestly, amend the rules where the rules themselves produce delay or error, and adopt new tools only inside guardrails that keep every decision human, reviewable, and accountable.

ES.2 **The delay record.** A defendant challenging a felony conviction waited an average of 1,077 days, nearly three years, from filing to a Court of Appeals opinion in fiscal year 2023. It improved to 842 days in fiscal year 2024, still more than two years.[1] Filings were steady, so the delay is not a surge artifact. The National Center for State Courts found, in its study of this state's Court of Appeals, that record preparation is the longest stage of an appeal and that the interval between completion of the record and the filing of the opening brief grew by roughly eight months at the 75th percentile in a single decade.[2] On the rules as written, a compliant appeal reaches submission in about five months.[3] The balance is extensions, transcript production, and queue time.

ES.3 **The error record.** Colorado has documented at least eleven exonerations in the National Registry of Exonerations, including men who served ten, thirteen, and seventeen years for crimes they did not commit.[4] The state's largest modern error event is not a single case but a quality-system failure: a Colorado Bureau of Investigation DNA analyst manipulated testing data across a caseload the Bureau's completed internal review counts at 1,003 impacted cases, after internal concerns raised in 2014 went unacted upon for nine years.[5] Error at this scale is a workflow and oversight problem before it is an individual one, and it should be governed the way aviation governs safety: reported without blame, counted in the open, and engineered against.

ES.4 **The proposal.** Part IV sets out four pillars. Pillar 1 adopts enforceable appellate time standards, repairs the record and transcript stage, and disciplines extensions by rule. Pillar 2 builds accuracy infrastructure: a verification duty for filings, a confidential error-reporting and learning system, forensic quality disclosure, and published counts of cases ending at procedural gates rather than on the merits. Pillar 3 modernizes workflows: a public timeliness and accuracy dashboard on the Branch's existing program, a secure internal artificial intelligence platform for court staff on the New Jersey model, and plain-language process design for the self-represented majority in family cases. Pillar 4 makes the system stronger in the ways that outlast any single

reform: an annual measurement report, a permanent evaluation function, and a court-adopted governance standard for artificial intelligence in court operations, on the model California adopted in 2025.

ES.5 **The reimagination.** Part III proposes the step the four pillars prepare for: an integrated artificial intelligence layer across the criminal docket. It flags potential constitutional defects to the court and to all parties while they can still be cured; it assembles for the deciding judge a verified map of each case: its issues, its record, and its consistency with statewide patterns; it sweeps closed and pending cases in days when an error signature is validated, so the next laboratory failure does not take years to surface; and it publishes the system's own sentencing, revocation, and gate patterns in aggregate. Every output is advisory, disclosed, logged, and disposed of by an accountable human. The components operate abroad today, in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and Singapore. Their integration under one accountability standard, in criminal cases, exists nowhere reviewed for this report. Colorado can build it first, without delegating a single decision.

ES.6 **Method and discipline.** Every load-bearing figure in this report traces to a verification register compiled for this submission; figures that could not be verified, including a Colorado-specific clearance-rate series and a Colorado appellate reversal rate, are not asserted and are instead identified as measurement gaps the proposal asks the Branch to close.[6] Each operational proposal is framed, where apt, as a pilot with pre-registered metrics and explicit stop conditions. The report's central principle is the one the Arizona Supreme Court stated when it declined to ban judicial use of artificial intelligence while insisting on control: decision-making is a human function and a core judicial responsibility that cannot be delegated.[7] Artificial intelligence in these proposals assembles records, checks citations, drafts summaries for human approval, and surfaces delay. It does not decide.

ES.7 **The ask.** The Court is asked to (1) refer the rule-amendment proposals in Part IV to the Advisory Committee on Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Civil Rules Committee, and the Evidence Rules Committee; (2) refer the artificial intelligence proposals (the governance standard, the staff platform, and the integrated layer of Part III) to the Legal Technology Advisory Committee, and ask the committee to address them in the annual guidance cycle that follows its initial recommendations;[8] (3) direct the State Court Administrator to establish the Pillar 3 measurement baseline within two quarters; and (4) publish the referred items for public comment in the ordinary course. Nothing here requires legislation or asks the Court to prejudge any matter.

Methodology and Sources

M.1 **Sources.** This report relies on the Colorado Judicial Branch's own published data (the Annual Statistical Report series, the Supreme Court Protocols, the Judicial Department's SMART Act performance plans, and Judicial Branch press releases), on the National Center for State Courts' study of the Colorado Court of Appeals and its national caseflow research, on the Bureau of Justice Statistics' study of state criminal appeals, on the National Registry of Exonerations, on reporting of the Colorado Bureau of Investigation's internal investigation, and on the published actions of other state judiciaries and the federal courts. Full citations appear in Appendix A.

M.2 **Verification.** Each load-bearing claim was checked against its source before drafting and graded CONFIRMED, CORRECTED, or UNVERIFIED in a verification register maintained with this submission. Only CONFIRMED claims, with register wording notes applied, appear in this report as fact. Three items frequently cited in public discussion could not be verified to that standard and are excluded as fact: a Colorado-specific clearance-rate series by district and case type; a Colorado-specific appellate reversal rate; and a current live total of Colorado exonerations beyond the Registry's published compilations through 2019. Where national studies are used, they are labeled national and are never restated as Colorado findings. The same discipline was applied to the operating systems cited in Part III (register section I): each is stated only as verified, and the widely reported Estonian "AI judge" is described in the register in its corrected form, the Ministry of Justice having stated that no such system exists.

M.3 **Definitions.** "Time to disposition" for appeals means elapsed days from the filing of the notice of appeal to issuance of the opinion or order disposing of the appeal, consistent with the Judicial Branch statistical series. Averages are arithmetic means of disposed cases in the stated fiscal year; percentile figures are identified as such. "Procedural gate" means a disposition that resolves a case without reaching the merits of the underlying claim, including exhaustion, preservation, timeliness, and standing grounds.

M.4 **Limitations.** Appellate averages describe disposed cases and therefore lag reforms already in place; the report notes where a figure's direction of travel matters more than its level. The fiscal year 2024 improvement in average appellate time (register A2) is acknowledged wherever the fiscal year 2023 figure is used. Cost discussion in Part IV is a framing of categories and verified anchors, not an appropriations estimate.

Part I. The Delay Record

1.1 **The headline figure.** In fiscal year 2023, a defendant challenging a felony conviction waited an average of 1,077 days from filing to a Court of Appeals opinion. In fiscal year 2024 the average improved to 842 days. Two features of this series deserve emphasis. First, the direction is encouraging and should be said plainly: the system moved, measurably, in one year. Second, the improved figure still exceeds two years for the class of cases in which the appellant is most likely to be in custody, and in which the victim, the witnesses, and the public all have a direct interest in finality.[1]

1.2 **Delay is not a volume problem.** Criminal appeal filings at the Court of Appeals held between 813 and 926 per year across fiscal years 2022 through 2024, and the pending criminal caseload declined after fiscal year 2023. Across all case types statewide, Colorado courts received 592,227 filings in fiscal year 2024, of which the Court of Appeals received 2,305 and the Supreme Court 1,340. A system whose inputs are flat and whose pending inventory is falling, but whose customers still wait two to three years, has a processing problem, not a demand problem.[9]

1.3 **Where the time goes.** The National Center for State Courts' study of the Colorado Court of Appeals, comparing appeals disposed in 2010 with those disposed in 2016 and 2017, found that the record preparation stage, the period from initiation of the appeal to completion of the record and transcript, was the longest of the three stages of an appeal. Measured end to end, the 75th percentile of time on appeal grew from 906 days for cases disposed in 2010 to 1,176 days for cases disposed in 2016 and 2017. The study also identified a fourth, largely invisible interval: the time between completion of the record and the filing of the opening brief, consumed substantially by extensions, which at the 75th percentile ran approximately eight months longer in the later cohort than in 2010.[2]

1.4 **The standard Colorado does not meet.** The Model Time Standards for State Appellate Courts provide that 75 percent of appeals should be resolved within 450 days. In the NCSC study, 75 percent of Colorado appeals initiated in 2015 were resolved within 631 days. The same study documents the countervailing fact that reform works: for direct criminal appeals initiated between 2006 and 2015, the median elapsed time fell from 804 days to 426 days under sustained caseflow management by the court.[10]

1.5 **Extensions are the mechanism, not the exception.** The Court of Appeals granted an average of seven extensions per appeal in the 2010 cohort and five in the 2016/17 cohort, while the length of individual grants increased, so total time grew. The court

has tightened policy in steps: a 2011 practice asking counsel to file one realistic extension request rather than serial thirty-day requests, and, from 2014, denial of extensions carrying an appeal beyond 365 days absent exceptional circumstances, with a three-judge panel considering the largest requests. Each of those steps is a policy of the court. None is a rule with published, uniform standards, and none is measured in public.[11]

1.6 **Transcripts sit on the critical path.** Under C.A.R. 10(c), the trial court clerk must transmit the record within 63 days of the notice of appeal, but the clerk does not transmit the record until transcripts are available. Transcript production is therefore the pacing item for the entire appellate process, and it is performed by a workforce governed substantially by a fee policy: Chief Justice Directive 05-03 reduces the per-page rate for state-paid reporters as lateness grows (90 percent of the ordinary rate at ten days late or less, 75 percent at eleven to thirty days, 50 percent beyond thirty days). The policy prices lateness. It does not prevent it, escalate it, or relieve the capacity shortage that causes it.[12]

1.7 **The written timetable versus the lived timetable.** Adding the rules' own periods after the notice of appeal (63 days for the record, 42 days for the opening brief, 35 for the answer, 21 for the reply) yields a fully compliant appeal ready for decision in roughly five months. Measured performance is four to seven times that figure. The gap is not produced by any single actor. It is produced by a system in which every participant's individual extension is reasonable and the aggregate is not.[3]

1.8 **Trial courts operate without published time standards.** The Judicial Branch reports filings and dispositions, and publishes dashboards on specific programs. It does not publish, in standard comparable form, district-by-district clearance rates or time-to-disposition percentiles against the Model Time Standards for State Trial Courts (for felonies: 75 percent within 90 days, 90 percent within 180 days, 98 percent within 365 days).[13] The best national evidence, the NCSC's Effective Criminal Case Management study of 1.2 million cases in 136 courts, found an average felony disposition time of 256 days, found that no studied court met the national standards, and identified continuances and presiding-judge caseflow culture as the principal controllable drivers.[14] Colorado cannot currently run that analysis on itself, because the underlying milestone data is not published in usable form. That is a finding in its own right, and Pillar 3 addresses it.

1.9 **Who bears the cost of delay.** For appellants in custody, delay is served time under a judgment that may not survive review. For victims, whose statutory rights include

notice of appellate proceedings, delay is a case that remains open for years after verdict. For the self-represented, who constituted 76 percent of the people in Colorado domestic relations cases in fiscal year 2025, delay compounds a process they must navigate without counsel.[15] For the courts themselves, delay is the single most visible measure by which the public judges the institution.

Part II. The Error Record

2.1 **Wrongful convictions are documented, not hypothetical.** The National Registry of Exonerations records at least eleven Colorado exonerations. Timothy Masters served about ten years of a life sentence before DNA evidence freed him in 2008. Tim Kennedy served thirteen years before his release in 2009. Robert Dewey served seventeen years for a murder he did not commit before his exoneration in 2012, and became the first person compensated under Colorado's 2013 wrongful-conviction compensation statute, receiving nearly $1.2 million structured at roughly $70,000 for each year of imprisonment.[4]

2.2 **Colorado has done systematic review before, episodically.** After the Masters and Kennedy cases, the Attorney General's office convened a review that screened 4,977 convictions dating to the 1960s, work that contributed to the Dewey exoneration. The precedent matters for Pillar 2: systematic, records-based review is a demonstrated Colorado capability. It has simply never been made a standing feature of the system.[16]

2.3 **The CBI failure is the controlling case study in system error.** Between at least 2008 and 2023, a Colorado Bureau of Investigation DNA analyst manipulated testing data: omitting material facts from official records, deleting data (including data showing male DNA present in samples from sexual assault kits), and departing from standard protocols. The Bureau's internal investigation, completed after an intern flagged anomalies in September 2023, identified 1,003 impacted cases. She pleaded guilty to four felonies and was sentenced in September 2026 to ten years in prison. Three features of the episode are institutional, not personal. First, the motive she described was throughput: moving cases along faster under caseload pressure. Second, a coworker had raised concerns about her work to a technical leader in 2014, nine years before the system acted; there was no escalation path that converted a concern into an audit. Third, detection came from an intern's observation, not from the laboratory's quality controls. The state has since approved approximately $7.5 million to address the fallout; Denver reopened thirteen previously closed sexual assault cases after retesting, producing new investigative leads; and at least one long-standing murder conviction has been vacated with the DNA mismanagement a central factor.[5]

2.4 **Error correction at the appellate stage is real but partial.** Nationally, the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that intermediate appellate courts reached the merits in 80 percent of criminal appeals resolved in 2010 and reversed in 14 percent of all appeals. The corollary is structural: about one appeal in five ends without a merits determination. Colorado publishes no equivalent series, so this state cannot say what

share of its appeals is resolved on procedural gates (exhaustion, preservation, timeliness, standing) rather than on the merits.[17]

2.5 **Gates have legitimate functions, and they should be measured rather than assumed.** Exhaustion and preservation rules develop records, respect the roles of coordinate decision-makers, and protect finality. A recent published example of the structure is *People v. Abdul-Rahman*, 2026 CO 33, which requires a postconviction challenger to exhaust an administrative appeal process before a court reaches the claim. This report takes no position on that or any other decided case. The point is narrower: a gate that decides a case is an outcome the system should count, classify, and report, and where the rules permit a defect to be cured, the litigant (frequently self-represented) should receive a plain-language notice identifying the gate and the cure before dismissal. At present neither the counting nor the notice is standard practice.[18]

2.6 **New error channels are opening at the same time.** Courts nationally are sanctioning filings containing fabricated citations produced by generative artificial intelligence, and at least one out-of-state judge has issued an order resting on nonexistent authority generated with a chatbot. Colorado addressed the lawyer-facing duties in its 2026 amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct. The court-operations side (verification infrastructure inside the filing and opinion process itself) remains unbuilt. Pillar 2 builds it, on the model Texas has proposed: a signing duty that expressly includes verification that citations, quotations, and holdings are not fabricated, backed by proportionate, graduated sanctions.[19]

2.7 **The throughline.** Delay and error are not separate problems. A system that takes three years to correct an error triples the error's cost; a laboratory rewarded for throughput manufactures the errors the appellate system must then slowly correct. The proposal therefore treats speed and accuracy as one engineering problem with two gauges, and insists on measuring both.

Part III. The Reimagination: An Integrated Artificial Intelligence Layer for Colorado Criminal Justice

3.1 **Why this Part stands apart.** Parts I and II document two failures with a common root. The delay record is a system that processes each case in isolation and cannot see its own queues. The error record is a system in which a quality failure known inside one office in 2014 remained invisible to every court relying on its product for nine more years. In both records, the information needed to act existed somewhere inside the system. What did not exist was machinery whose function is to find it: to read across cases, to compare each case against the whole docket, and to surface what no individual participant is positioned to notice. This Part proposes that machinery, as an integrated layer across the criminal docket. It is deliberately the most ambitious part of this report, and it is built to the same discipline as the rest. Every function is advisory. Every output is disclosed to the parties it touches. Every output is logged. Every disposition is made by an accountable human. The layer's ambition and its restraint are the same design decision: a system that decided cases could not responsibly be integrated at this scale, while a system that only flags, maps, sweeps, and publishes can be, and its value rises with the completeness of its integration.

3.2 **The mechanisms.** The layer is specified as six mechanisms. Mechanism R.1 screens cases at defined milestones for constitutional and procedural risk and delivers each flag to the court and to all parties equally. Mechanism R.2 analyzes the docket as a whole and publishes the patterns no single court can observe. Mechanism R.3 sweeps closed and pending cases when a specific error is validated, so that every case the error may have touched surfaces at once. Mechanism R.4 assembles for the deciding judge a verified map of the case, its issues, its record, and its place in statewide patterns. Mechanism R.5 warns litigants, in real time and in plain language, when their own filings risk forfeiting an issue on a technicality. Mechanism R.6, the Sunlight Ledger, records every flag, map, sweep, notice, and human disposition in auditable form and publishes the aggregates. The mechanisms run on the secure internal platform proposed in Proposal 3.2, operate only under the governance standard proposed in Proposal 4.1, and are evaluated by the standing function proposed in Proposal 4.3. Each mechanism below is stated with its governance, its metrics, and its known failure modes.

3.3 **Mechanism R.1: Constitutional early warning.** At defined milestones in a criminal case (charging, plea, sentencing, revocation, the filing of a notice of appeal, and the filing of a postconviction petition), automated screening compares the case file against a constitutional checklist: the speedy-trial clock and its exclusions; limitations

periods; exposure created when an amended statute, guideline, or supervision standard is applied to earlier conduct; conditions enforced in a manner that may penalize silence or condition liberty on admissions; forensic results offered without the quality disclosures proposed in Proposal 2.3; jurisdictional defects apparent on the face of the record; and preservation risks of the kind counted under Proposal 2.4. A flag states the category, the record basis, and the authority that makes the matter a question. It recommends nothing. The flag issues simultaneously to the court and to every party, so the layer never becomes a private channel to the bench. Each flag receives a recorded human disposition (sustained, not sustained, or noted) with a reason code, and the disposition enters the Ledger (Mechanism R.6). Governance: the checklist is a public document maintained by the rules committees; model and checklist versions are published; no category may be added by a vendor or by staff practice. At pilot, screening runs on records held within judiciary systems, and the checklist states the record source for each category; a category that depends on records held by another agency is activated only under a written data-sharing agreement with that agency. Metrics: precision, measured as the share of flags sustained on human review, reported by category; median time from milestone to flag; the share of sustained flags resolved before disposition. Failure modes: alert fatigue if precision falls (the pilot sets a minimum precision floor for each category, and a category that misses its floor in two consecutive quarters is suspended for redesign); checklist ossification (annual committee review against the year's appellate decisions); asymmetric advantage (defeated by design, because flags are symmetric within the case); adversarial drafting, in which a filer shapes a document to trigger a flag or to evade one (contained by the same features: a flag recommends nothing, issues to all parties, and takes effect only through a recorded human disposition; the evaluation function monitors flag and sustain rates by filer type for evidence of gaming).

3.4 **Mechanism R.2: The system sees itself.** No judge, and no single district, can observe the docket whole. Quarterly, the platform produces aggregate analyses for the Court and the State Court Administrator, published on the dashboard proposed in Proposal 3.1: sentencing distributions by offense class and district against statewide medians; revocation outcomes by stated ground; gate rates by category, on the classification built under Proposal 2.4; continuance and extension patterns, on the structured data of Proposal 3.4; and correlations between case outcomes and forensic providers, so that a laboratory whose results deviate from statewide patterns becomes visible as data before it becomes visible as scandal. Disparity signals (by race, sex, and representation status) are computed and published with their intervals and with an express statement of what such signals can and cannot show. They are prompts for inquiry by the Court and by researchers. They are not findings about any judge or any

case, and no output of this mechanism may be directed to, or used in, an individual pending case. Governance: the methodology is published in advance; small cells are suppressed; the evaluation function (Proposal 4.3) audits the analyses annually. Metrics: publication on schedule; data completeness by district; documented follow-on inquiries commissioned. Failure modes: ecological inference, drawing case-level conclusions from aggregate patterns (mitigated by the express limits stated here and by publishing methods with results); metric gaming (the measures are descriptive and are attached to no individual evaluation and no funding consequence); false precision (intervals are published; point estimates never appear alone); provider comparisons confounded by case mix (any provider-level analysis is published with its case-mix context and framed as a prompt for audit, never as a performance finding).

3.5 **Mechanism R.3: Retrospective error mining.** When an error signature is validated (a laboratory failure, a vacated testing protocol, a standard held invalid, a defective form or instruction), the system should not wait for each affected person to discover it. A standing protocol provides: a human panel (a designee of the Court, the State Court Administrator, and the conviction-review liaison proposed in Proposal 2.6) approves a written signature specification; the platform sweeps closed and pending case data for that signature and produces a candidate list; human reviewers confirm the affected cases; and notice issues to the parties through the channels the rules already provide. The Woods matter is the worked example. A completed internal review counted 1,003 impacted cases; concerns had been raised internally in 2014; detection came in 2023; and identification of the affected caseload proceeded by expanding manual review across years, at a state cost of approximately $7.5 million in fallout funding alone (Part II, ¶2.3). The signature in that matter (analyst, period, test type, reporting pattern) is precisely the kind of specification the investigation eventually constructed by hand. A sweep of the kind proposed here is designed to return the candidate list in days, so that the human work that cannot be automated (confirmation, notice, and litigation) begins from a complete list instead of discovering its own scope case by case. Colorado's earlier experience points the same way: the Attorney General's screening of 4,977 convictions after the Masters and Kennedy releases (¶2.2) was this mechanism performed manually, once, as an exception. Mechanism R.3 makes it a standing capability. Governance: every sweep is logged in the Ledger; signature specifications are published after the sweep completes; case-identifying material is confined to the parties and the reviewing offices; aggregate counts are published. Sealed, expunged, and juvenile records are excluded from every sweep except as the governing order and law expressly permit, and the panel's written specification states the treatment of those records before the sweep runs. Metrics: elapsed days from signature approval to candidate list; confirmation rate on human

review; elapsed time from confirmation to party notice. Failure modes: overbroad signatures that flood reviewers (specifications are tiered, and the panel may narrow a signature and rerun the sweep); privacy (the sweep runs inside judiciary and prosecution data under existing access rules, and nothing case-specific is published).

3.6 **Mechanism R.4: The digital second chair.** For each case in the pilot classes, the platform assembles a case map for the assigned judicial officer: the issues presented; each issue's preservation status and standard of review; the controlling authorities, with verified citations; the record map (the testimony, exhibits, and orders each issue turns on, with pinpoint record references); the open questions the briefing does not answer; and a consistency note stating how the same issue has been treated across the state's courts, in aggregate. The map is disclosed to all parties in full when it is delivered to the court, and a party may file corrections, which are logged (Mechanism R.6). The map decides nothing and drafts nothing dispositive. It is a verified picture of the ground on which the judge must decide, drawn to a completeness that a busy chambers cannot always achieve unaided. The failure this mechanism is built against is already on the national record: in October 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction and ordered a case reassigned after orders drafted with undisclosed artificial intelligence assistance were found to contain fabricated facts, false quotations, and a citation to a case that does not exist.[34] Under this proposal, every authority in a case map must pass the verification standard of Proposal 2.5 before delivery, and disclosure to the parties converts verification from a private hope into a checked fact. Governance: map templates are approved by the appellate courts for the pilot divisions; model versions are logged; the map is a working paper of the court, disclosed to the parties as stated. Metrics: staff hours per case against baseline; party corrections filed per hundred maps (a quality signal, expected to fall as the tool improves); citation defects reaching issuance, measured under Proposal 2.5, with a target of zero. Failure modes: anchoring, the risk that a map's framing quietly becomes the decision's framing (mitigated by requiring the map to state contrary authority and contrary dispositions where they exist, by party disclosure and correction, and by the artificial intelligence literacy education proposed in Proposal 4.4); automation complacency (mitigated by the verification pass and by human re-verification of a sample of maps under Proposal 4.3); manipulated inputs (filed documents are treated as untrusted input: record data is extracted under fixed schemas, and no instruction embedded in a filed document is executed as an instruction to the system).

3.7 **Mechanism R.5: The preservation-trap neutralizer.** Proposal 2.4 counts the gates and offers a cure notice when a filing is already subject to dismissal. This mechanism

moves the warning to the moment it can still change the outcome. At filing, and again when a transcript or order posts a preservation-relevant event, automated checks compare the filing against the gate structure (vehicle, exhaustion sequence, timeliness, required contents) and, where the rules permit cure, issue the filer a plain-language notice: what is at risk, under which rule, and what the rules allow to be done about it, stated in calendar dates. The population this serves is the one the current system serves worst: litigants without counsel, who were 76 percent of the people in Colorado domestic relations cases in fiscal year 2025 (¶1.9) and who appear throughout the postconviction process, where a single sequencing error ends the case before any court reaches its substance (¶2.5). Notices state rules and deadlines. They do not advise a course of action, and their texts are approved by the rules committees to hold that line. Governance: notice texts are committee-approved forms; every notice is logged (Mechanism R.6); every notice provides a route to a human clerk. Metrics: notices issued; cure rate after notice, against the baseline established under Proposal 2.4; the gate share of dispositions over time. Failure modes: false reassurance, where a check misses a defect (notices state that the check is not exhaustive and extends no deadline); drift toward legal advice (held by form approval and by the rules-and-dates-only content rule).

3.8 **Mechanism R.6: The Sunlight Ledger.** Each mechanism above produces outputs that someone must be able to audit, or the layer will not deserve the trust that integration requires. The Ledger is an append-only record, maintained by the State Court Administrator, of every flag, map, sweep, notice, and pattern report: the model and checklist version that produced it, the class of inputs used, the output, the human disposition, and the time at each step. Case-level entries are judiciary records under existing access rules. Aggregate statistics are published quarterly with the dashboard (Proposal 3.1): flags by category and precision; sweeps run and their confirmation rates; case-map corrections; notice cure rates; pattern reports issued. The evaluation function (Proposal 4.3) holds standing audit access. Entries are hash-chained at writing, so that alteration of a prior entry is detectable; write access is role-based and held by the Administrator's office; and a correction is made by a new entry, never by editing an old one. This accounting is not an appendage to the reimagination; it is the condition of it. A court asked to integrate machinery into criminal adjudication is entitled to ask how it will know what the machinery did. The Ledger is the answer, and it is why this Part can propose integration at a scale that undisclosed and unlogged assistance, of the kind described in ¶3.6, can never responsibly reach.

3.9 **The components exist; the integration does not.** Each function proposed in this Part has an operating ancestor, stated here only as verified in the register. Brazil's Supreme Federal Court screens its national appellate intake with Victor, a system

developed with the University of Brasília that classifies extraordinary appeals against the Court's general-repercussion themes in seconds per appeal, work that took staff roughly half an hour, and has done so in production since 2020.[28] In Buenos Aires, the Public Prosecutor's Office has operated Prometea since 2017 for detection, classification, document automation, deadline control, and outcome prediction in standardized matters, the last a function this proposal does not adopt, with evaluated processing times for those matters falling from months to days; Colombia's Constitutional Court adopted the same technology, as PretorIA, to sort its constitutional-protection docket.[29] Singapore's Small Claims Tribunals, working with Harvey.AI since 2023, moved from on-demand translation of court documents to generative case summarization for Tribunal Magistrates, extended to the self-represented parties before them.[30] The judiciary of England and Wales has, since December 2023, governed judicial use of artificial intelligence by published guidance that permits assistance in preparatory work while fixing personal responsibility on the judicial office holder.[31] Estonia supplies the substrate lesson and the caution in a single example: a digital-by-default court infrastructure, including speech transcription, decision anonymization, and automated processing of undisputed payment orders, in a system whose Ministry of Justice has stated plainly that the widely reported Estonian "AI judge" does not exist, a correction this report adopts in place of the common account.[32] In the United States, the documented pattern is narrower: judges interviewed for the National Center for State Courts report using generative tools for administrative and preparatory tasks, unanimously on the condition that judges remain the deciders, and no court-operated issue-spotting system was verified in the research for this report.[33] The conclusion drawn here is not that Colorado should copy any of these systems. It is that triage, classification, summarization, deadline control, and governed judicial assistance are each proven at operating scale, while the integrated layer proposed in this Part (flagging, mapping, sweeping, and publishing under one ledger, in criminal cases) has not been assembled in any system reviewed. That is the opportunity, and it is available to the court system that already has the dashboard program, the case data, and the committee machinery the rest of this report describes.

3.10 **Sequencing.** The layer is adopted in the order of its risk, inside the roadmap of Part V. First, the Ledger and the governance standard, because nothing else should run unlogged. Second, the appellate pilot of Mechanisms R.1 and R.4 in two Court of Appeals divisions, where records are complete and the delay documented in Part I is longest. Third, the Mechanism R.3 protocol, which is primarily a data-access and approval protocol and can be adopted administratively at any time, so that it exists before the next signature event rather than after it. Fourth, Mechanism R.2 quarterly

pattern publication, once two quarters of Ledger data exist. Fifth, Mechanism R.5, with the cure-notice pilot of Proposal 2.4. Each mechanism carries the pilot discipline of Part IV: pre-registered metrics, published results, and stop conditions, including suspension of any flag category whose precision fails its floor and termination of the second-chair pilot if party-correction rates do not fall across its first year.

3.11 **What this Part asks the Court to see.** Parts I and II describe a system that learns of its worst failures late, from interns, journalists, and the wrongly convicted, and that corrects them one case at a time across years. The reimagination is a system that watches itself as a matter of routine: constitutional risk flagged while it can still be cured; every judge deciding on a verified map rather than on the portion of the record that time allowed; every validated error swept across the whole caseload in days; and the whole performance published. None of that requires the machinery to judge. It requires the machinery to look, completely and on the record, so that the humans who judge are never again the last to know.

Part IV. The Proposal

4.0 **Design principles.** Four principles govern every proposal in this Part, and each is stated so the Court can hold the program to it. (1) **Minimum necessary process:** every procedural requirement should map to a documented purpose in accuracy, fairness, or finality, and should be simplified or retired when it no longer serves that purpose. (2) **Human decision, machine assistance:** artificial intelligence may assemble, check, summarize, and flag; it may not adjudicate, and no AI output enters an order, an opinion, or a communication to a litigant without review and adoption by an accountable human. Part III builds its integrated layer entirely on this principle: its mechanisms flag, map, sweep, and publish; none of them decides, and none withholds an output from any party. (3) **Measure before mandating:** operational changes begin as pilots with pre-registered metrics and stop conditions, and scale only on published results. (4) **Transparency as default:** performance data that the Branch collects about itself should be published in standard form, including when it is unflattering.

Pillar 1. End Long Litigation Periods

4.1 **Proposal 1.1: Adopt appellate time standards by rule.** The Court should amend the Colorado Appellate Rules (a new section within C.A.R. 10 or a companion provision adopted with C.A.R. 31) to adopt the Model Time Standards for State Appellate Courts as the Branch's official benchmarks: 75 percent of appeals resolved within 450 days of the notice of appeal, with median and 75th percentile performance published annually by case type. Standards of this kind are performance commitments, not jurisdictional deadlines; no litigant gains or loses rights by them. Their function is to give the system a number to be managed against, in public.[10]

4.2 **Proposal 1.2: Repair the record stage.** Amend C.A.R. 10(c) to (a) decouple the clerk's record from the transcript, so the clerk's record transmits within the existing 63 days and transcripts follow on a separately tracked clock with their own deadline; (b) require milestone timestamps in the case management system at designation, reporter assignment, transcript delivery, and certification, visible to the appellate clerk; and (c) replace open-ended extension of the record deadline under C.A.R. 10(c)(2) with a staged escalation: at 30 days past a transcript deadline, notice to the managing court reporter and the trial court chief judge; at 60 days, notice to the Court of Appeals chief judge's designee; at 90 days, the appeal is flagged on a published aging report. The Chief Justice Directive 05-03 fee schedule should be retained during the pilot and evaluated, not assumed effective.[12]

4.3 **Proposal 1.3: Pilot verified digital transcription.** Authorize a two-district pilot in which proceedings are captured on the court's digital recording system and transcripts are produced from the recording with certified human verification, under the supervision of the managing court reporter. Metrics, pre-registered: turnaround time per transcript page volume; sampled accuracy (independent re-transcription of a random 2 percent of pages, errors per 100 pages against the certified version); cost per page against the current fee schedule. Stop conditions: sampled accuracy below the certified-reporter baseline in two consecutive quarters, or turnaround no better than baseline after two quarters, ends the pilot and restores the standard workflow in the pilot districts. The pilot tests, under Colorado court control, a cognate transcription question now being litigated in Texas, and it does so as measurement rather than as doctrine.[20]

4.4 **Proposal 1.4: Discipline extensions by rule.** Amend C.A.R. 26, as applied to appeals, to provide: one extension of up to 30 days per brief as of right on a short-form filing; any further extension requires a specific showing (record defect, transcript delay documented in the milestone record, or comparable cause) and is capped in cumulative days per stage; extensions that would carry an appeal beyond 365 days from the notice of appeal require panel approval, codifying the court's existing practice as a rule; and the State Court Administrator publishes aggregate extension statistics (requests, grants, days granted, by stage) annually. The study's extension findings (¶1.5) are the premise: grants are individually reasonable and collectively decisive, and extension policy is where the collective effect is set.[11]

4.5 **Proposal 1.5: Adopt trial court time benchmarks and differentiated case management.** The Court should adopt the Model Time Standards for State Trial Courts as reporting benchmarks by rule or Chief Justice Directive, require districts to report time-to-disposition percentiles and clearance rates in the standard form Pillar 3 establishes, and direct presiding judges to conduct quarterly caseflow reviews of cases exceeding the benchmarks, with continuance cause recorded in structured form (Proposal 3.4). Benchmarks are explicitly not speedy-trial law and create no dismissal remedy; they exist so that a district drifting from its peers is visible early, to itself first.[13]

4.6 **Proposal 1.6: Early record-completeness screening.** Within 14 days of record transmission, appellate clerk staff, assisted by automated completeness checks (missing volumes, unindexed exhibits, citation-format defects in the record index), issue a completeness notice. Defects are cured at the record stage rather than discovered during briefing, which the NCSC study identified as one driver of the post-record

interval. This is staff workflow, not a rule change, and can begin on the Court's administrative direction.[2]

Pillar 2. Decrease Wrongful Determinations

4.7 **Proposal 2.1: A verification duty for filings, in the procedure rules.** Building on the 2026 amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Court should amend the signing provisions of the civil, criminal, and appellate rules (including C.R.C.P. 11, the Crim. P. signature provisions, and C.A.R. 32's certification framework) to provide that signing a filing certifies that the signer has reviewed it and verified the accuracy of its citations, quotations, and stated holdings, whether or not artificial intelligence tools were used in preparation. Sanctions should be graduated and proportionate, beginning with notice and an opportunity to cure, on the model Texas has proposed. The duty runs to the signer, a human, in all cases.[19]

4.8 **Proposal 2.2: A confidential error-reporting and learning system.** The Court should direct the State Court Administrator to establish, for judges, clerks, court reporters, interpreters, and contracted forensic providers, a confidential reporting channel for errors and near misses in case processing: record defects, transcription errors, missed deadlines, citation errors caught before issuance, forensic rework notices, and comparable events. The design follows the aviation safety model: reports are de-identified before analysis; reports may not be used in discipline except where the underlying conduct is independently shown to be willful; an annual public report publishes aggregate counts by category and the corrective actions taken. Metrics: reporting volume (rising volume in year one indicates trust, not deterioration); repeat-category rate (the measure that must fall). Stop condition: any documented use of a report in a disciplinary proceeding outside the willful-conduct exception suspends the program pending the Court's review, because the program's value depends entirely on reporters believing the firewall.[21] The reports this system collects are also the raw material of Mechanism R.3 (Part III): a validated pattern across reports is what becomes an error signature and, on approval, a caseload sweep.

4.9 **Proposal 2.3: Forensic quality disclosure at the point of use.** The Woods episode's central lesson for courts is that a laboratory's quality problems were knowable inside the system years before they were known to the judges and litigants relying on its results. The Court should refer to the Evidence Rules Committee, with the Criminal Rules Committee, a proposal to require, in criminal cases, disclosure to the court and the parties of any open corrective action, audit finding, or proficiency failure materially affecting a forensic discipline or analyst whose results are offered, together

with a standing referral protocol under which laboratory quality notices reach the chief judges of affected districts within 30 days. As an interim administrative step, the Court should convene a working group with the Attorney General and the Colorado Bureau of Investigation on the disclosure mechanics. No provision of this proposal comments on the admissibility of any result in any case.[5] The disclosure stream created here also supplies two inputs to Part III: the forensic correlation analysis of Mechanism R.2 and the signatures swept under Mechanism R.3.

4.10 **Proposal 2.4: Count the gates, and give litigants a cure notice.** The State Court Administrator should classify every appellate and postconviction disposition by outcome type: merits determination, or procedural disposition by category (exhaustion, preservation, timeliness, standing, other), and publish the distribution annually. Separately, as a clerk-practice pilot in the Court of Appeals and two district courts, when a filing is subject to dismissal on a curable procedural ground, the clerk issues a plain-language notice identifying the defect, the rule it arises under, and the cure or alternative vehicle the rules permit, before dismissal where the rules allow a cure period. The rules committees should study whether standard cure periods should be codified. Metrics: gate share of dispositions (baseline established in year one); cure rate after notice; dismissal rate change. The purpose is information first and reform second: the system should know its own gate rate before anyone argues about what it ought to be.[17] Mechanism R.5 (Part III) carries the cure notice upstream to the moment of filing, before dismissal is in prospect.

4.11 **Proposal 2.5: Pre-issuance citation verification for opinions.** As a chambers workflow standard in the appellate courts, every draft opinion and order undergoes a documented citation-verification pass (staff-run, tool-assisted) confirming that each cited authority exists and supports the proposition for which it is cited, before issuance. A one-year pilot in two Court of Appeals divisions should measure staff time per opinion and defects caught, and report both. The Oklahoma episode, in which a custody order issued with nonexistent citations generated with a chatbot, is the cautionary case: the verification step is cheap precisely because it is routine.[19] The same verification pass is a precondition of every case map delivered under Mechanism R.4 (Part III).

4.12 **Proposal 2.6: A standing referral pathway for conviction review.** The Court cannot direct prosecutors, and this proposal does not ask it to. It asks the Court to support, through records access and a published referral protocol, the kind of systematic conviction screening Colorado conducted after the Masters and Kennedy releases, by (a) designating a Judicial Branch liaison for conviction-review referrals

from the Attorney General and district attorneys, (b) prioritizing digitization and production of records in cases a reviewing office certifies for screening, and (c) reporting annually, in aggregate, the number of referrals and record productions completed. The judiciary's contribution to error correction is fast, complete records and a door that is visibly open.[16]

Pillar 3. Improve Workflows

4.13 **Proposal 3.1: A public Justice Timeliness and Accuracy dashboard.** The Branch already publishes dashboards (eviction filings, criminal-case text reminders, representation statistics, restitution). The Court should direct the State Court Administrator to add a standing dashboard, updated quarterly, reporting: time-to-disposition percentiles by court level, district, and case type against the benchmarks adopted under Proposals 1.1 and 1.5; clearance rates; age of the active pending caseload; appellate stage durations (record, briefing, decision) in the aggregate; extension usage under Proposal 1.4; disposition outcome mix under Proposal 2.4; error-report aggregates under Proposal 2.2; and the aggregate Sunlight Ledger statistics of Mechanism R.6 (Part III). This single measure closes the three verification gaps this report had to record (no comparable clearance series, no Colorado reversal or gate rates), and it does so prospectively and permanently.[22]

4.14 **Proposal 3.2: A secure internal AI platform for court staff, deployed the New Jersey way.** The Branch should procure or build a generative AI environment inside judiciary infrastructure, with authenticated access, no retention of court data by outside vendors, and a defined use-case registry. Deployment should copy the features that made New Jersey's rollout work: begin with a small pilot cohort, train before granting access, expand on measured demand, and pair the tool with the bar through the Legal Technology Advisory Committee's guidance process. Approved initial use cases, each with a named human owner: summarization of records and filings for staff review; drafting of routine administrative correspondence; meeting and hearing logistics; research assistance with mandatory source verification; and plain-language drafting under Proposal 3.3. Prohibited uses, stated in the adopting policy: any adjudicative determination; any communication to a litigant that has not been reviewed and adopted by a human; any use of confidential case information in a public tool.[23] The platform is also the substrate for the integrated layer of Part III; Mechanisms R.1 and R.4 should be entered in the use-case registry as named use cases when their pilots are authorized.

4.15 **Proposal 3.3: Plain-language process design for self-represented litigants.** In fiscal year 2025, 76 percent of the people in Colorado domestic relations cases had no lawyer. The Court should authorize a two-district pilot in domestic relations in which orders and next-step notices are issued with a plain-language summary page, generated with tool assistance and approved by the issuing judicial officer, stating what was decided, what each party must do next, and the deadlines in calendar dates. Metrics: comprehension measured by a short validated survey of recipients; rates of default, continuance for non-appearance, and corrective filings against matched non-pilot divisions. Stop conditions: any increase in corrective filings attributable to summary errors in two consecutive quarters, or comprehension gains below the pre-registered threshold after one year, ends or redesigns the pilot.[15]

4.16 **Proposal 3.4: Structured continuance and milestone data.** Require, by administrative direction implemented in the case management system, that every continuance order record a cause category from a short standard list, and that the milestone timestamps created under Proposals 1.2 and 1.6 be retained as structured data. This is the unglamorous precondition of everything else in this report: the Effective Criminal Case Management study could identify continuances as the principal controllable driver of delay only because the studied courts recorded them in analyzable form.[14]

4.17 **Proposal 3.5: Record assembly modernization.** Extend the Branch's electronic filing investment to the appellate record itself: a standardized electronic record format with automated indexing, pagination checks, and exhibit inventories, generated at the trial court level at the close of proceedings rather than assembled after a notice of appeal. Target metric: median days from notice of appeal to complete clerk's record, against the 63-day standard of C.A.R. 10(c), published on the Proposal 3.1 dashboard.[3]

Pillar 4. Build a Stronger Justice System

4.18 **Proposal 4.1: A court-adopted governance standard for AI in court operations.** The Court should adopt, by rule or by a published administrative standard on the model of California's Rule 10.43 and accompanying standard of judicial administration, a governance floor for artificial intelligence in court operations: written use policies for each court; verification and accountability duties for AI-assisted work product; bias and accuracy testing for any tool used in case processing; security, access-control, retention, and incident-reporting requirements for any tool that processes court data; disclosure when a public-facing material is wholly generated by AI; a public registry of approved use cases; and an express statement that adjudication may not be delegated

to an AI system. Colorado's Legal Technology Advisory Committee, which has spent a year on the professional-conduct side of these questions, is the natural drafting resource, and this proposal is framed to be referred to it.[24] This standard is the adopting instrument for the integrated layer proposed in Part III; no mechanism in that Part operates except under it.

4.19 **Proposal 4.2: An annual State of the Judiciary data report.** Consolidate the measures created by this program into one annual public report, presented with the Judicial Department's SMART Act performance plan cycle, covering timeliness, accuracy, access, and workload, with year-over-year comparisons and a section reporting pilot results, including pilots that were stopped and why. A system that publishes its own stopped pilots is a system the public can trust with larger ones.[22]

4.20 **Proposal 4.3: A standing evaluation function.** Convert the pilot discipline of this proposal into permanent machinery: a small evaluation function within the State Court Administrator's Office (or by standing agreement with the National Center for State Courts, which performed the 2018 appellate study) that maintains a public registry of court innovation pilots, each with pre-registered metrics, an evaluation date, and a published result. No pilot becomes permanent without a published evaluation.[2] The registry and audit remit of this function expressly include the six mechanisms of Part III.

4.21 **Proposal 4.4: Education as infrastructure.** Add caseflow management and AI literacy, including verification practice and the failure modes documented in Part II, to judicial education and to clerk and reporter continuing education, following New Jersey's model of training paired with tool access and continuing-education credit. The audience includes the presiding and chief judges whose caseflow culture the national evidence identifies as the strongest single predictor of timeliness.[14]

4.22 **Proposal 4.5: Publish the rulemaking conversation.** Extend the Court's existing practice (advance publication and comment for significant proposals) with a standing public docket for referred items under this program, including a summary of comments received and the committees' responses at adoption. The reform program asks the public to trust new machinery inside the courts; showing the work is part of the machinery.[25]

Part V. Implementation Roadmap and Cost Framing

5.1 **Phase 0: Referral and baseline (first two quarters).** The Court refers the rule items to the rules committees and the governance items to the Legal Technology Advisory Committee (Proposal 4.1); the State Court Administrator establishes the measurement baseline (Proposals 2.4 and 3.1 in initial form), the pilot registry (Proposal 4.3), and the Sunlight Ledger (Mechanism R.6) in initial form, and adopts the retrospective error-mining protocol (Mechanism R.3) so the capability exists before it is needed. Deliverable: a published baseline report. Cost character: staff time within existing appropriations, plus dashboard development on existing Branch platforms.

5.2 **Phase 1: Pilots (quarters three through six).** The transcription pilot (1.3), the gate-cure notice pilot (2.4), the opinion-verification pilot (2.5), the internal AI platform cohort (3.2), the plain-language pilot (3.3), and the appellate early-warning and second-chair pilot (Mechanisms R.1 and R.4, in two Court of Appeals divisions) run concurrently, each under its pre-registered metrics and stop conditions. Deliverable: published pilot evaluations, including negative results. Cost character: the platform licensing and evaluation contracts are the principal new expenditures; both are pilot-scaled by design.

5.3 **Phase 2: Rule amendments on evidence (months ten through eighteen).** The rules committees take up Proposals 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, and 2.1 with pilot data in hand, and the items are published for public comment in the ordinary course. Deliverable: adopted rule changes, or published committee reports explaining declinations. Cost character: committee process within existing structures.

5.4 **Phase 3: Adoption decisions and the annual cycle (year two onward).** Pilots that meet their metrics are proposed for statewide adoption; pilots that miss are stopped and the stoppage is reported in the first annual State of the Judiciary data report (Proposal 4.2). The dashboard and annual report continue as permanent functions. The quarterly pattern reports of Mechanism R.2 and the filing-time notices of Mechanism R. 5 join the cycle as their Ledger data matures.

5.5 **Cost framing, stated honestly.** This report does not present a total program cost, because a credible total depends on procurement and staffing decisions that belong to the Branch. It offers three verified anchors instead. First, scale: the Judicial Branch operates on a budget of approximately $800 million; the Phase 0 and Phase 1 items are, by design, small fractions of existing operations, and each carries a stop condition that caps the cost of being wrong.[26] Second, the cost of the status quo in delay is paid by litigants, victims, and custodial appellants in time that no appropriation refunds. Third,

the cost of error is quantifiable in the state's own recent experience: approximately $7.5 million appropriated to address a single laboratory's failure, and nearly $1.2 million paid to compensate one man for seventeen years of wrongful imprisonment. Accuracy infrastructure is not an ornament on the budget. Priced against the failures it exists to prevent, it is among the cheapest lines in it.[27]

Part VI. Scope and Limits of This Proposal

6.1 This proposal would not delegate any adjudicative decision to an artificial intelligence system, and it recommends the Court state that prohibition expressly. The integrated layer proposed in Part III is designed inside that prohibition, not as an exception to it, and is embraced as an integral part of this proposal: its mechanisms flag constitutional risk, map cases, sweep for validated error, warn litigants of forfeiture risk, and publish patterns, and every one of those outputs is advisory, disclosed to the parties, logged in the Sunlight Ledger, and disposed of by an accountable human. The limits stated in this Part apply to Part III in full. It would not convert performance benchmarks into jurisdictional deadlines or create new grounds for dismissal, reversal, or sanction beyond the graduated verification sanctions of Proposal 2.1. It would not alter the substantive rights of any litigant, the standards of appellate review, or the law of preservation, exhaustion, or standing; Proposal 2.4 measures the gate structure and improves notice, Mechanism R.5 gives notice of preservation risk and changes no preservation law, and any change to the gates themselves is reserved to the rules committees on the measured record. It would not direct prosecutors, laboratories, or any executive agency; its forensic and conviction-review items are disclosure, referral, and convening measures within the judiciary's own sphere. It would not reduce the role of certified court reporters; the transcription pilot is an evaluated comparison under court supervision, with the existing workforce as its baseline and its control.

6.2 The proponent is a citizen, not a member of the bar, and this report is a policy proposal, not a legal filing. It addresses the system in general terms. It does not concern, and should not be read as addressing, any pending case or any individual litigant, including the proponent.

Notes

1. Colorado Judicial Branch, Annual Statistical Report FY2023, Table 12, and Annual Statistical Report FY2024, Table 12 (average days, notice of appeal to opinion, Criminal - Direct Appeal: 1,077 days FY2023; 842 days FY2024). Verification register A1, A2. ↩↩

2. Nicole L. Waters and Shauna M. Strickland, *Examining Delay: Its Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions in the Colorado Court of Appeals*, National Center for State Courts (March 2018). Register B1 to B7. ↩↩↩↩

3. C.A.R. 4(b) (49 days); C.A.R. 10(c)(2) (record within 63 days; text as republished in Rule Change 2023(05)); C.A.R. 31 briefing schedule as stated in Judicial Branch form JDF 1910 (42, 35, and 21 days). Register C1 to C3. ↩↩↩

4. National Registry of Exonerations (10 Colorado exonerations, 1989 to 2018; 11 through 2019); Associated Press reporting on Robert Dewey (exonerated 2012; 17 years; nearly $1.2 million at roughly $70,000 per year under the 2013 compensation statute). Register E1 to E4. ↩↩

5. Colorado Bureau of Investigation internal investigation reporting (1,003 impacted cases in the completed review; conduct findings; 2014 internal concerns; September 2023 detection); Colorado Public Radio (guilty plea to four felonies; ten-year sentence, September 8, 2026); fallout reporting (approximately $7.5 million approved; Denver case reopenings; vacatur in the Clark case). Register F1 to F4. ↩↩↩

6. Verification register D5 and E6 (UNVERIFIED items excluded as fact). ↩

7. Arizona Supreme Court, declining a petition for a moratorium on judicial AI use and continuing controlled testing (2026 reporting); Arizona Steering Committee on AI and the Courts, *Generative AI Ethical Best Practices* (November 14, 2024). Register H4. ↩

8. Colorado Judicial Branch press release, "Chief Justice Márquez Launches Initiative to Form Legal Technology Advisory Committee" (September 15, 2025). Register H1. ↩

9. Colorado Judicial Branch, Annual Statistical Report series, Table 8 (criminal appeal filings: 813 in fiscal year 2022, 926 in fiscal year 2023, 888 in fiscal year 2024) and Table 10 (total criminal cases pending: 1,604 at June 30, 2023; 1,554 at June 30, 2024). Register A3. ↩

10. NCSC, *Model Time Standards for State Appellate Courts* (2014), as applied in Waters and Strickland (2018): 75 percent within 450 days; Colorado 2015 cohort, 75 percent within 631 days; median for initiated direct criminal appeals, 804 days (2006) to 426 days (2015). Register B3, B4. ↩↩

11. Waters and Strickland (2018): extensions averaged 7 per appeal (2010) and 5 (2016/17) with longer grants; 2011 single-request practice; 2014 policy on extensions beyond 365 days. Annual Statistical Report FY2024 (briefing-stage backlog). Register B5, A4. ↩↩

12. Chief Justice Directive 05-03 fee schedule, as summarized in Waters and Strickland (2018); C.A.R. 10(c) (no transmission until transcripts are available). Register B6, C2. ↩↩

13. NCSC, *Model Time Standards for State Trial Courts* (2011), adopted by the Conference of Chief Justices, the Conference of State Court Administrators, the ABA House of Delegates, and the National Association for Court Management. Register D1. ↩↩

14. National Center for State Courts, Effective Criminal Case Management project (1.2 million cases; 136 courts; 21 states), as summarized by the State Justice Institute: average felony disposition 256 days; 83 percent within 365 days against the 98 percent standard; continuances and presiding-judge culture as principal drivers. Register D2. ↩↩↩

15. Colorado Judicial Branch report (parties without attorney representation, July 2024 to June 2025: 76 percent in domestic relations cases), as covered by the Daily Camera. Register D4. ↩↩

16. Contemporaneous reporting of the Attorney General's conviction review (4,977 convictions screened). Register E5. ↩↩

17. Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Criminal Appeals in State Courts* (September 2015): intermediate appellate courts reviewed 80 percent of appeals on the merits; overall reversal rate 14 percent (appeals resolved in 2010). Register E7. ↩↩

18. *People v. Abdul-Rahman*, 2026 CO 33 (exhaustion requirement before Crim. P. 35(c) review). Cited for structure only. Register E8. ↩

19. Texas Supreme Court proposed rule amendments (signer verification certification; proportionate sanctions), as reported by Law360 (2026); Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, 2026 AI-related amendments, *The Colorado Lawyer*. Register H7, H2. ↩↩↩

20. *In re Patrick Hughey*, No. 25-0463 (Tex.), argued October 6, 2026 (AI-generated deposition transcript), as reported by the ABA Journal. Pending; noted as a national development only. Register H7. ↩

21. Design modeled on the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System model of confidential, de-identified, discipline-firewalled incident reporting, as adapted in the patient-safety literature. Program design is the proponent's; no empirical claim is made for it in the register. ↩

22. Colorado Judicial Branch, Data and Reports page (existing dashboards: eviction, text reminders, representation, restitution). Register G5, dossier D5. ↩↩

23. New Jersey judiciary internal AI program (pilot of 11 users in early 2025; more than 2,000 users; secure internal deployment; training; bar collaboration), as reported by Law360. Register H5. ↩

24. Judicial Council of California, Rule 10.43 and standard of judicial administration (written AI use policies by December 15, 2025; disclosure for wholly AI-generated public materials). Register H6. ↩

25. Civil Rules Committee description of the Court's publication and comment practice. Register G7. ↩

26. Colorado Supreme Court Protocols (rev. April 2026): Judicial Branch budget approximately $800 million; 4,200 employees; 23 judicial districts. Register G4. ↩

27. Register F4 (CBI fallout appropriation) and E4 (Dewey compensation). ↩

28. Supreme Federal Court of Brazil (STF), Victor, developed with the University of Brasília: classification of extraordinary appeals by general-repercussion theme; in production since 2020;

screening time from roughly 30 minutes per appeal manually to approximately 5 seconds, as compiled in the C-NAPSE / Evidoria decision brief on the system. Register I1. ↩

29. Ministerio Público Fiscal, Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, Prometea (in use since 2017), developed with the Innovation and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (IALAB) of the University of Buenos Aires; Constitutional Court of Colombia, PretorIA, applying the same technology to the tutela docket. Processing-time findings as compiled in the Inter-American Development Bank's fAIrLAC case profile and UNESCO's Global Toolkit on AI and the Rule of Law. Register I5. ↩

30. Singapore Judiciary, Small Claims Tribunals collaboration with Harvey.AI (since 2023): on-demand translation of court documents (late 2024 to March 2025); generative case summarization for Tribunal Magistrates, extended to the parties (late 2025). Media release, Singapore Judiciary; Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, Response delivered at the Opening of the Legal Year 2026. Register I3. ↩

31. Courts and Tribunals Judiciary (England and Wales), *Artificial Intelligence (AI): Guidance for Judicial Office Holders* (December 12, 2023). Register I4. ↩

32. Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs (Estonia), "Estonia does not develop AI Judge" (February 16, 2022); deployed tools (Salme speech transcription, Krat anonymization, payment-order procedural automation) as analyzed in Kumar, Juneja, and Slamowitz, *Building Trust Before Automation: Estonia's Integration of AI in Its Courts* (Paradigm, September 2026). Register I2. ↩

33. National Center for State Courts and Thomson Reuters Institute, AI Policy Consortium for Law and Courts, *Judicial Use of Generative AI: Lessons Learned* (interviews conducted October and November 2025). Register I6. No court-operated issue-spotting system was verified in this research (register I7, UNVERIFIED, excluded as fact). ↩

34. United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, decision of October 22, 2026, vacating a preliminary injunction and ordering reassignment of the case, as reported by Bloomberg Law (October 22, 2026) and the ABA Journal (October 26, 2026). Register I8. ↩

Appendix A. Sources and Bibliography

Colorado Judicial Branch and Colorado sources

1. Colorado Judicial Branch. *Annual Statistical Report*, FY2023 and FY2024 series. https://www.coloradojudicial.gov/data-and-reports
2. Colorado Supreme Court. *Supreme Court Protocols* (revised April 2026). https://www.coloradojudicial.gov/supreme-court/supreme-court-protocols
3. Colorado Judicial Branch. Executive Division, Office of the State Court Administrator. https://www.coloradojudicial.gov/about/executive-division
4. Colorado Judicial Branch. "Chief Justice Márquez Launches Initiative to Form Legal Technology Advisory Committee." Press release, September 15, 2025. https://www.coloradojudicial.gov/media/press-release/chief-justice-marquez-launches-initiative-form-legal-technology-advisory
5. Colorado Judicial Branch. Civil Rules Committee. https://www.coloradojudicial.gov/civil-rules-committee?language=es
6. Colorado Judicial Branch. Rule Change 2023(05) (C.A.R. 10(c) text). https://cl.cobar.org/from-the-courts/rule-change-20235/
7. Colorado Judicial Branch. Form JDF 1910, Appeals Quick Guide.
8. Judicial Department. *Fiscal Year 2024 Performance Plan* (SMART Act), November 1, 2023; FY2024-25 SMART Act Report. https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/judicial_fy24-25_smart_act_report.pdf
9. Martinez, Julia K. "The 2026 AI-Related Amendments to the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct." *The Colorado Lawyer* (2026). https://cl.cobar.org/features/the-2026-ai-related-amendments-to-the-colorado-rules-of-professional-conduct/
10. Colorado Judicial Institute. "Explainer: Key Facts About Colorado's Courts" (FY2024 filing volume from the Annual Statistical Report FY2024). https://coloradojudicialinstitute.org/what-we-do/public-education/explainer-key-facts-about-colorados-courts.html
11. Rocky Mountain Voice. "Weiser's record: A system falling behind" (May 1, 2026) (analysis of the Annual Statistical Report series, consulted during research; the statistical figures drawn from it are verified directly against the Branch's published tables, verification register A1 to A4). https://rockymountainvoice.com/2026/05/01/weisers-record-a-system-falling-behind/

National research

1. Waters, Nicole L., and Shauna M. Strickland. *Examining Delay: Its Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions in the Colorado Court of Appeals*. National

Center for State Courts, March 2018. https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/appellate/id/1040/download
2. National Center for State Courts. *Model Time Standards for State Trial Courts* (2011); *Model Time Standards for State Appellate Courts* (2014).
3. National Center for State Courts. Effective Criminal Case Management project; summary, State Justice Institute. https://www.sji.gov/groundbreaking-project-could-lead-to-faster-courts-nationwide/
4. Bureau of Justice Statistics. *Criminal Appeals in State Courts* (September 2015). https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/BJSStudyCriminalAppealStateCourt2010.pdf
5. National Registry of Exonerations. *Thirty Years of Innocence: Wrongful Convictions and Exonerations in the United States, 1989-2018* (Table 5, exonerations by state); Registry by-state compilation through 2019.

Error record reporting

1. Associated Press. Reporting on Robert Dewey's compensation under the 2013 statute. https://www.corrections1.com/corrections/articles/after-unjust-sentence-colo-begins-paying-inmate-6vVMzFyLX2rs7Ya5/
2. Legal News. Reporting on the Attorney General's conviction review (Masters, Kennedy, Dewey; 4,977 convictions screened). https://www.legalnews.com/Home/Articles?DataId=1322892
3. Forensic Magazine. "Over 1,000 Cases Impacted by Misconduct from Former CBI Forensic Scientist"; "CBI: Forensic Scientist Manipulated Over 650 Cases." https://www.forensicmag.com/3594-All-News/616945-Over-1-000-Cases-Impacted-by-Misconduct-from-Former-CBI-Forensic-Scientist/
4. Colorado Public Radio. "Former state scientist sentenced to prison for falsifying DNA samples in hundreds of cases" (September 8, 2026). https://www.cpr.org/2026/09/08/missy-woods-sentenced-prison/

Comparative and technology sources

1. National Center for State Courts, Conference of Chief Justices, and Conference of State Court Administrators. AI Rapid Response Team interim guidance (announced December 2024; guidance 2025). https://www.law360.co.uk/pulse/delaware-pulse/articles/1805084/rapid-response-team-releases-ai-guidance-for-state-courts
2. Arizona Supreme Court, Steering Committee on AI and the Courts. *Generative AI Ethical Best Practices* (November 14, 2024); 50-state survey, Justia. https://www.justia.com/trials-litigation/ai-and-attorney-ethics-rules-50-state-survey/

3. Law360. "How 3 Courts Are Approaching AI Adoption" (New Jersey internal platform). https://www.law360.co.uk/pulse/texas-pulse/articles/2493364/how-3-courts-are-approaching-ai-adoption
4. Judicial Council of California. Rule 10.43 and standard of judicial administration (generative AI in court work). https://citizenportal.ai/articles/6516990/California/Judicial/Judicial-Council-of-California/Judicial-Council-adopts-rule-and-standard-governing-generative-AI-in-court-work-disclosure-privacy-and-verification-required
5. Law360. "Texas Supreme Court Weighs New Rules To Tackle AI Misuse" (2026). https://www.law360.co.uk/pulse/texas-pulse/articles/2494562/texas-supreme-court-weighs-new-rules-to-tackle-ai-misuse
6. ABA Journal. "Texas Supreme Court could allow AI-generated transcripts of depositions" (October 7, 2026). https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/texas-supreme-court-could-allow-ai-generated-transcripts-of-depositions
7. Utah Supreme Court Ad Hoc Committee on Regulatory Reform. AI and Legal Tech working group materials (September 2, 2026). https://utcourts.gov/content/dam/committees/regulatory_reform/agendas/2026.09.02.Reg%20Reform%20AI%20Tech%20Meeting%20Materials.pdf
8. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. "Judiciary Cites Progress on Case Management, Property Authority, and AI" (September 17, 2026). https://www.uscourts.gov/data-news/judiciary-news/2026/09/17/judiciary-cites-progress-case-management-property-authority-and-ai

Integrated-layer exemplars (Part III)

1. C-NAPSE / Evidoria. "Victor: Brazil's Supreme Federal Court AI for Extraordinary Appeal Triage." Decision brief (accessed October 26, 2026). http://evidoria.eu/practice/victor-brazils-supreme-federal-court-ai-for-extraordinary-appeal-triage/brief.pdf
2. Inter-American Development Bank, fAIrLAC. "Prometea" (case profile). https://fairlac.iadb.org/en/prometea
3. Singapore Judiciary. "New Generative AI-powered Case Summarisation Tool to Help Small Claims Tribunals Users" (media release); Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, "Response delivered at the Opening of the Legal Year 2026." https://www.judiciary.gov.sg/news-and-resources/news/news-details/media-release--new-generative-ai-powered-case-summarisation-tool-to-help-small-claims-tribunals-users
4. Courts and Tribunals Judiciary (England and Wales). "Artificial Intelligence (AI): Guidance for Judicial Office Holders" (December 12, 2023), as reported by DAC

Beachcroft (February 2024). https://www.dacbeachcroft.com/en/What-we-think/Judiciary%20publishes%20guidance%20for%20judicial%20office%20holders%20on%20the%20u
5. Kumar, Pranjal, Fahad A. Juneja, and Charles L. Slamowitz. "Building Trust Before Automation: Estonia's Integration of AI in Its Courts." Paradigm (September 2026); Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs (Estonia), "Estonia does not develop AI Judge" (February 16, 2022). https://paradigm.legal/papers/building-trust-before-automation-estonia-ai-courts.pdf
6. National Center for State Courts / Thomson Reuters Institute, AI Policy Consortium for Law and Courts. "Judicial Use of Generative AI: Lessons Learned" (2026). https://www.ncsc.org/resources-courts/judicial-use-generative-ai-lessons-learned
7. ABA Journal. "5th Circuit blasts federal judge for AI errors in rulings" (October 26, 2026); Bloomberg Law, "Judge Whose Ruling Had AI-Generated Errors Sees Case Reassigned" (October 22, 2026). https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/5th-circuit-blasts-federal-judge-for-ai-errors-in-rulings

Appendix B. Index of Proposed Rule Actions

Proposal	Instrument	Destination
1.1 Appellate time standards	New provision with C.A.R. 10 / C.A.R. 31	Appellate Rules Committee
1.2 Record stage repair	Amend C.A.R. 10(c); CJD 05-03 framework evaluated	Appellate Rules Committee; Chief Justice
1.3 Verified digital transcription pilot	Administrative authorization, two districts	Court / SCAO
1.4 Extension discipline	Amend C.A.R. 26 (appellate application)	Appellate Rules Committee
1.5 Trial court time benchmarks	Rule or Chief Justice Directive	Court; Criminal and Civil Rules Committees
1.6 Record-completeness screening	Administrative (appellate clerk practice)	Court of Appeals; SCAO
2.1 Filing verification duty	Amend C.R.C.P. 11, Crim. P. signature provisions, C.A.R. 32 framework	All three rules committees
2.2 Error-reporting and learning system	Administrative program, SCAO	Court / SCAO
2.3 Forensic quality disclosure	Referral for rule study; interim working group	Evidence and Criminal Rules Committees

Proposal	Instrument	Destination
2.4 Gate measurement; cure notice	Administrative classification; clerk-practice pilot; committee study	SCAO; rules committees
2.5 Opinion citation verification	Chambers workflow standard; pilot	Appellate courts
2.6 Conviction-review referral pathway	Interagency protocol; records prioritization	Court / SCAO liaison
3.1 Timeliness and accuracy dashboard	Administrative, SCAO	Court / SCAO
3.2 Secure internal AI platform	Procurement and policy, phased	SCAO; LTAC guidance
3.3 Plain-language pilot	Administrative, two districts	Court / SCAO
3.4 Structured continuance data	Administrative (case management system)	SCAO
3.5 Electronic record standard	Administrative with ITS	SCAO
4.1 AI governance standard	Rule or published administrative standard	Court; LTAC drafting
4.2 Annual data report	Administrative, aligned to SMART Act cycle	SCAO
4.3 Standing evaluation function	Administrative (SCAO or NCSC agreement)	Court / SCAO
4.4 Education	Judicial and staff education programs	Judicial education; SCAO
4.5 Public rulemaking docket	Extension of existing comment practice	Court; rules committees
R.1 Constitutional early warning	Administrative pilot under the Proposal 4.1 governance standard; checklist content maintained by rules committees	Court / SCAO; rules committees
R.2 Cross-docket pattern analysis	Administrative analytics program; quarterly published analyses	SCAO; Court
R.3 Retrospective error mining	Standing administrative protocol; signature approval panel	Court / SCAO; conviction-review liaison (Proposal 2.6)
R.4 Digital second chair	Chambers workflow pilot, two Court of Appeals divisions	Appellate courts; LTAC guidance

Proposal	Instrument	Destination
R.5 Preservation-trap neutralizer	Filing-system and clerk-practice pilot, with Proposal 2.4	SCAO; rules committees (notice content)
R.6 Sunlight Ledger	Administrative record system; quarterly aggregate publication	SCAO; evaluation function (Proposal 4.3)

End of report.